By Sarah Porter
IntroductionAlthough today, the Republican Party is often identified as a defender of the right to bear arms, Americans witnessed vastly different attitudes among policy-makers during the 1960s. Many staunchly conservative Republicans including Ronald Reagan, who served as California’s governor and was later elected president of the United States, lent support to bills that implemented new restrictions for gun owners. These efforts were not only grounded in a desire to reduce gun violence in American cities but were also framed by the transformations and divisions that emerged within the civil rights and Black Power movements during the late 1960s. |
...TODAY...THE REPUBLICAN PARTY IS OFTEN IDENTIFIED AS A DEFENDER OF THE RIGHT TO BEAR ARMS... |
The advocacy of armed self-defense by increasingly militant groups, including the Black Panther Party for Self-Defense (BPP), sparked fear among policymakers, who translated these anxieties into legislation designed to undermine these forms of social activism. One piece of legislation that plainly demonstrated the manner in which legislators utilized gun control to impede social and political activism was the Mulford Act. Enacted in California in 1967, this state-level initiative prohibited the open carry of loaded firearms in public spaces. Both the development and passage of the Mulford Act were inextricably linked to the emergence of the BPP and highlighted the unique obstacles that this organization faced. The BPP’s militant posture and revolutionary platform elevated the group to the national stage, but its controversial image simultaneously handicapped its efforts. Because the BPP relied on strategies that were not widely used by mainstream civil rights activists, the group faced new forms of legal repression. Policymakers successfully employed gun control legislation like the Mulford Act to undercut the BPP. By criminalizing the BPP’s use of weapons on California streets and prompting a shift toward new forms of organizing, the Mulford Act weakened the BPP and precipitated a change in course for the organization.
The Black Panther PartyAlthough popular interpretations of the civil rights movement emphasize the strategy of nonviolence, these accounts neglect the rich legacy of self-defense among African Americans and fail to acknowledge the legal repression with which these efforts were met. The work of activists such as former Nation of Islam spokesperson Malcolm X and militant NAACP leader Robert F. Williams facilitated the development of the BPP. Inspired by their calls for armed self-defense, Huey Newton and Bobby Seale founded the BPP in Oakland, California in October 1966. The organization represented an alternative to the nonviolent civil disobedience championed by Martin Luther King Jr. and the Southern Christian Leadership Conference. In contrast to King, the BPP rejected nonviolence as both a tactic and a philosophy, emphasizing instead the importance of physical survival to the continuing struggle for civil and human rights. The BPP also sought to foster a sense of self-reliance among African American communities. In order to achieve this, Newton and Seale constructed a Ten Point Program articulating demands for self-determination, equal access to education, decent housing and “an immediate end to POLICE BRUTALITY and MURDER of Black people.”1 This final demand became a centerpiece of the BPP, which addressed issues of police violence by assembling patrols to monitor police activity.Taking their inspiration from similar citizen groups in Los Angeles, the BPP adapted the community patrols to its program by carrying them out while armed. |
Previous groups relied on cameras and tape recorders to corroborate reports of police misconduct, but little action was taken by departments to rectify these abuses. By using intimidation, the BPP hoped its patrols would produce atangible change in police behavior. The group not only used firearms but also relied on a thorough knowledge of the law as another weapon. Members studied the Declaration of Independence, the US Constitution, and the California Legal Code, and they used these documents to inform themselves and others of their rights as citizens.The BPP’s patrols bolstered the group’s image and often served as recruiting tools as well. Community residents subjected to police harassment were often aided by BPP members, who provided assistance through legal knowledge and bail funds, and according to Newton, “many citizens came right out of jail and into the party.”2 The use of guns by the BPP represented a tactical strategy as well as a powerful visual symbol. The image of intimidating black men brandishing weapons and boldly defying the white power structure offered a refreshing alternative to those disillusioned with the hollow legislative victories of the civil rights movement.3 In promoting a revolutionary platform, Newton and Seale understood that violence was inevitable. They embraced the notion that Mao Tse-Tung put forth in his Little Red Book: “In order to get rid of the gun it is necessary to pick up the gun.”4 By picking up the gun, the BPP sought to challenge the police monopoly on violence in urban communities of color. |
THE BLACK PANTHER PARTY'S IMAGE RESONATED WITH MANY AFRICAN AMERICAN COMMUNITIES... (BUT) REPRESENTED A THREAT TO THE WHITE ESTABLISHMENT... |
The BPP’s image resonated with many African American communities, and the organization began to gain recognition throughout the Oakland area. However, the BPP represented a threat to the white establishment and the Oakland police, and lawmakers immediately sought a solution. On April 5, 1967, legislator Don Mulford introduced a bill that would prohibit citizens from openly carrying loaded firearms in public spaces.5 Mulford introduced the legislation a mere six weeks after the BPP had engaged in a confrontation with San Francisco police, further underlining the bill’s objective. While escorting Betty Shabazz, the widow of Malcolm X, to an event to commemorate her husband, Huey Newton had a brief scuffle with a reporter, leading police to intervene. A standoff between Newton and the officer ensued, and reports of the incident likened the BPP’s armed escort to a “frightening army.” 6 |
Mulford’s bill was a direct response to the BPP’s use of firearms as a mode of protest. Mulford even boasted of his intent to sabotage the organization by calling into an Oakland radio program during a feature including BPP members to publicly announce his proposed bill. The Mulford Act was hardly the first effort to disarm African Americans. For instance, certain Black Codes passed following the Civil War required African Americans to obtain special permits to possess a gun. While earlier legislation was more explicit about its intent to target African Americans, measures like the Mulford Act and its prohibition of public carry technically applied evenly to the entire population. However, gun control legislation like the Mulford Act could be used to target specific groups through application. Furthermore, the Mulford Act did not apply to law enforcement, meaning that police officers had new leverage over the BPP. Newton claimed that the BPP never perceived vigilante groups like the Ku Klux Klan to be its primary threat. Rather, it was state forces such as the National Guard and local police that posed the most danger to the organization. The BPP’s central opposition was law enforcement, and by disarming the BPP while allowing law enforcement to retain its weapons, the Mulford Act would shift the balance of power to favor police officers.
In order to voice their opposition to the bill and raise awareness of the brutality that African Americans faced at the hands of law enforcement, the BPP decided to travel to the state capitol in Sacramento. The family of Denzil Dowell, an unarmed black man who was shot and killed by a California police officer, had approached the BPP for aid earlier that month. In response, the BPP met with the county district attorney and appealed to the sheriff’s department for further investigation into the shooting. Having exhausted the appropriate legal channels with no success, the BPP decided to use the trip to Sacramento to publicize the issue. The threat posed by the Mulford Act resonated even more within the context of the Dowell shooting. Members of the BPP traveled to the capitol on May 2, 1967, and boldly entered the building armed (Figure 1). Seale delivered a passionate executive mandate to legislators and the media, declaring that “the time has come for Black people to arm themselves against this terror before it is too late” and that “the pending Mulford Act brings the hour of doom one step nearer.”7 |
Seale’s statement highlighted the importance of self-defense in the lives of African Americans and underlined the fact that the Mulford Act did not only pose a threat to the BPP but entire communities. The demonstration in Sacramento was legal, but upon departure, BPP members failed to remove the ammunition from their firearms, violating an obscure fish and game code.8 This mistake furnished an opportunity for authorities to arrest twenty-four members of the group. Even before the Mulford Act had taken effect, the authorities pursued legislation as a means to suppress BPP activities.
AftermathAlthough the BPP’s protest received widespread coverage and elevated the organization’s image nationally, the state response created an array of obstacles for the group. Rather than deterring the passage of the Mulford Act, the Sacramento demonstration accelerated its progress and encouraged Mulford to reexamine and stiffen the bill. An article in the San Francisco Chronicle revealed that the BPP’s “invasion” allowed Mulford to declare his bill an issue of urgency, which meant it could be enacted immediately with Governor Reagan’s signature.9 The bill was signed into law on July 28, 1967, and effectively criminalized the BPP’s use of weapons in police patrols. |
...THE PROTEST RECEIVED WIDESPREAD COVERAGE AND ELEVATED THE ORGANIZATION'S IMAGE NATIONALLY... |
The arrests in Sacramento further exacerbated the situation. Although Newton had wisely remained in Oakland and was able to bail the group out, the $40,000 expense diminished the organization’s funds. Many key members, including Seale, received six-month jail sentences, and their absences frustrated efforts to mobilize the group. As BPP member Kathleen Cleaver described, “The party had no funds to continue renting its storefront office in Oakland, and no meetings were being held.”10 The repercussions of the Sacramento demonstration hobbled the BPP and testified to the determination of policymakers and law enforcement to undercut its efforts.
Additionally, the passage of the Mulford Act initiated a shift in BPP programs. The use of community patrols had functioned primarily as a survival program, and the BPP turned to new programs to promote self-preservation among African American communities. In 1968, the Oakland chapter launched the first Free Breakfast for Children Program, and soon thereafter established free health clinics, liberation schools, transportation programs, and drug rehabilitation services across the country. Each of these initiatives moderated the BPP’s image in the public eye, promoted self-reliance in black communities, and instilled residents with a revolutionary consciousness. While the expansion of local programs, prompted in part by the Mulford Act, was remarkably successful and garnered support from many moderate institutions including churches, these efforts elicited intensified state repression.11 J. Edgar Hoover, the director of the Federal Bureau of Investigation, targeted the BPP’s community activism relentlessly by spreading inflammatory propaganda and discouraging community support. Realizing that these programs were incredibly effective methods of forging relationships with moderate sectors, Hoover sought to undercut the BPP by authorizing unwarranted raids, generating discord among members, and employing direct violence at times.12 |
The passage of the Mulford Act also prompted a shift from armed self-defense to armed resistance for both Newton and the BPP. From the start, Newton had envisioned the BPP as the foundation for a truly revolutionary program that provided an alternative to the spontaneous and chaotic violence that erupted in cities like Watts, CA, and Detroit, MI, during the late 1960s. By strictly adhering to the law, Newton aimed to promote uniformity and to provide the groundwork for a legitimate revolutionary force. However, because the law no longer facilitated the BPP’s agenda, Newton refocused his sights and looked for solutions that did not flow through traditional legal channels. Building upon rights and freedoms that underpinned the Declaration of Independence, Newton advocated for the alteration or abolishment of destructive governments, as the original American revolutionaries had done so zealously. Newton’s ideological evolution was visible in an issue of The Black Panther from June 20, 1967. Stating “the people should not respect rules that are not serving them,” Newton went on to claim that “it is the duty of the poor to write and construct rules and laws that are in their better interest.”13 |
...THE MULFORD ACT REPRESENTED A DETERMINED EFFORT TO UNDERMINE AFRICAN AMERICAN DISSENT... |
Throughout the summer, Newton’s writings revealed his shifting perceptions of the BPP’s role in the wake of the Mulford Act. Identifying the police as an occupying force, Newton designated the BPP as the legitimate representative and vanguard party of black communities. The waves of urban rebellions that consumed American cities during the summer of 1967 validated Newton’s conviction that the time for revolution was approaching, and he sought to place the BPP at the forefront of this resistance. In this manner, the Mulford Act signaled a new direction for the BPP and ushered in an era of violent confrontation. |
Conclusion
The passage of the Mulford Act represented a determined effort to undermine African American dissent during the late 1960s. New forms of activism spawned new strategies of repression, and the BPP’s reliance on firearms and legal knowledge made gun control legislation a viable route to undercut the organization’s efforts. The Mulford Act ultimately crippled one of the BPP’s central programs, while simultaneously propelling monumental shifts within the organization and leading to increased clashes with law enforcement. Efforts to neutralize the BPP, as evidenced by the Mulford Act and other firearm restrictions, offer compelling examples of how legal repression was used to curtail activism during this period. The historical connection between gun control and efforts to sabotage the BPP offer contemporary audiences a new lens through which they might view current debates on gun control and understand its repercussions for minority groups.
Sarah Porter '18Sarah Porter is a graduating, senior history and sociology double major from Lampasas, Texas. Sarah participated in the 2017-2018 class of the Undergraduate Research Scholars where she completed her thesis, which culminated in this work, under the guidance of Dr. Julia Erin Wood. Sarah plans to attend graduate school in history beginning in the fall of 2018. Vertical Divider
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